Stay Informed

The Fourth District of the California Court of Appeal recently affirmed a trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the operator of a haunted house based on the primary assumption of risk doctrine.

In Griffin v. Haunted Hotel, Inc., Scott Griffin was injured when he tripped and fell on the grounds of a haunted house operated by Haunted Hotel. After passing through what he understood to be the haunted house’s exit, Mr. Griffin was approached by one of the haunted house’s actors wielding a gas powered chainsaw. Unbeknownst to Mr. Griffin, this was the haunted house’s final scare: patrons were led to believe they had exited the haunted house, only to be met by one more extreme fright. Mr. Griffin ran from the actor and a chase ensued. During the chase, Mr. Griffin fell and injured his wrist.

Haunted Hotel moved for summary judgment on the grounds that under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, Haunted Hotel did not breach any duty to Mr. Griffin. Relying on the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in the case of Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) (holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine applies to any recreational activity involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants where risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity), Haunted Hotel argued that the primary assumption of risk doctrine operates as a bar against Mr. Griffin’s claims. The appellate court agreed.

The appellate court held that the primary point of a haunted house is to scare people, and the inherent risk that someone will become scared, react by running away, and fall cannot be eliminated without changing the basic character of the activity. In other words, who would want to go to a haunted house that is not scary? In doing so, the appellate court clarified that whether a recreational activity involves an inherent risk is a question of law properly considered on summary judgment. Furthermore, the appellate court explained that Mr. Griffin’s subjective state of mind, both as to whether he understood the actor wielding the chainsaw to be a part of the haunted house or consented to assuming the risk of being frightened by this actor, was irrelevant in this context.

Moreover, there was no evidence to create a triable issue as to whether Haunted Hotel unreasonably increased the risk of injury beyond those risks inherent in a haunted house experience or otherwise acted recklessly. The appellate court honed in on the fact that although Haunted Hotel’s conduct encouraged patrons to run, despite knowing of the risk of harm, this conduct did not increase the inherent risk associated with attending a haunted house. In addition, Mr. Griffin’s argument that Haunted Hotel acted recklessly was rejected because, prior to Mr. Griffin’s fall, other patrons had run and fallen in the same location. There were very few such patrons and none of them suffered injury. Finally, the appellate court was not persuaded by the possibility that the condition of the area where Mr. Griffin fell could have contributed to his fall, noting that what “could be” is too speculative to create a triable issue.

Ultimately, the appellate court concluded that being chased within the physical confines of the haunted house by a “chainsaw carrying maniac” was a fundamental part and inherent risk of this amusement which Mr. Griffin voluntarily paid money to experience.